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ABSTRACT 
Mergers and acquisitions activity has been increasing impressively in the past 
decades originating significant research interest. Though, the results obtained from 
previous studies regarding acquirers’ post-acquisition returns are contradictory. 
Therefore, it remains unclear whether the shareholders of acquiring firms profit from 
M&A.  
While there is a significant body of research in the M&A performance there is 
only a scarce number of studies regarding the performance of hotel and lodging 
companies. Additionally, most of these studies have analysed the short-term impact of 
mergers on stock returns, while the long-term influence of mergers on equity value of 
acquiring firms in the hotel and lodging industry has been reasonably ignored. 
Considering the lack of studies regarding post-acquisition performance of the 
lodging industry, this dissertation, will use newly available data to address the shortage 
of literature, namely on long-term performance. This study aims to help financial 
stakeholders within the industry and broaden the existent literature regarding M&A of 
listed firms within the hotel industry.  
The results of this study suggest that the acquisition of hotel and lodging firms 
by other firm of the same industry do not generate value to the acquiring firms’ 
shareholder as the impact on the short and long-term performance of acquiring firm is 
mostly neutral.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: hospitality industry; long-term performance; acquiring firms; 
financial performance; operational performance; hotel company; performance measures. 
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SUMÁRIO 
A atividade de fusões e aquisições tem crescido de forma impressionante nas 
últimas décadas, originando um significante interesse na sua investigação. No entanto, 
os resultados obtidos em estudos anteriores sobre os retornos pós-aquisição das 
empresas adquirentes são contraditórios. Portanto, há incertezas quanto a se os 
acionistas das empresas adquirentes lucram efetivamente com fusões e aquisições. 
Embora haja um número significativo de estudos sobre o desempenho das F&A, 
apenas há um diminuto número de estudos relacionados com o desempenho das 
empresas do sector da hotelaria e hospedagem. Adicionalmente, a maioria destes 
estudos analisaram o impacto a curto prazo das F&A sobre os rendimentos de capital 
próprio, enquanto que o impacto a longo prazo das F&A sobre o valor patrimonial das 
empresas adquirentes no sector hoteleiro e hoteleiro foi escassamente estudado. 
Considerando a heterogeneidade das informações disponíveis sobre o 
desempenho pós-aquisição do setor da hotelaria e hospedagem, é oportuno estudá-lo 
com dados recém-disponíveis e abordar a escassez de literatura sobre o desempenho a 
longo prazo. Este estudo visa ajudar os stakeholders financeiros dentro da indústria e 
ampliar a literatura existente sobre F&A de empresas cotadas dentro da indústria 
hoteleira. 
Os resultados deste estudo sugerem que o desempenho a curto e longo prazo da 
aquisição de hotéis não gera efeitos lucrativos, uma vez que os resultados indicam 
efeitos maioritariamente neutros. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decades, M&A research is trying to establish if whether M&A 
maximizes the firm’s value or not. On one hand, M&A can benefit firms with several 
sources of synergies; cost reduction, lower taxes, and lower cost of capital (Ross et al., 
2002). However, on the other hand, M&A can also have the potential to harm firms, due 
to overpayment, slow pace of integration and poor strategy (Roll, 1986).  
Concerning the acquisitions in the hotel and lodging industry, there has been 
over 13,000 deals valuing a total of 775.1 billion USD since 1985 1 , growing 
impressively in both size and number of deals during this period2. According to Kwansa 
(1994), M&A in the hotel and lodging sector was the path for growth and preserving 
market share, since markets were saturated and the fixed costs of new concept 
development were high. The continuous consolidation allowed large companies to 
become even larger through M&A (Hsu and Jang, 2006). 
While there is several number of deals in the hotel and lodging industry, the 
number of studies regarding the performance of hotel and lodging companies before and 
after the deals is scarce. Although, there is an agreement that targets’ post-acquisition 
performance is positive (Kwansa, 1994; Canina, 2001; Kim, 2006; Kim et al., 2008), 
regarding the acquirers’ post-acquisition performance there is a feud. Some studies 
found evidence that acquirers gained from M&A activity (Canina, 2001; Yang et al., 
2009; Ma et al., 2011; Chatfield et al., 2012), while others found the opposite (Andrew, 
1988; Sheel and Nagpal, 2000; Hsu and Jang, 2006; Kim, 2006; Kim et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, most of these studies have analysed only the short-term impact of mergers 
on equity using stock returns measures (Andrew, 1988; Kwansa, 1994; Sheel and 
Nagpal, 2000; Canina, 2001; Kim et al., 2008; Ma et al., 2011; Chatfield et al., 2012), 
while the long-term influence of mergers on equity value of acquiring firms in the hotel 
and lodging industry has been reasonably ignored (Ma et al., 2011).  
Appropriately, considering the past three decades of sharp increase in the M&A 
activities of hotels and lodging companies in history plus the mixed information 
                                               
1 Source: Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances (IMAA). https://imaa-institute.org/m-and-a-by-
industries/ 
2 See annex 1. 
  
 
 
2 
available regarding post-acquisition performance of the lodging industry, this 
dissertation, using newly available data, will address this gap on long-term 
performance. This study aims to help financial stakeholders within the industry and 
broaden the existent literature regarding M&A of listed firms within the hotel and 
lodging industry.  
This study aims to answer the following: Does hotel operational and 
shareholder’s performance increase after acquiring another hotel?  
The results regarding the short and long-term performance of acquiring hotel 
and lodging firms after the acquisitions are neutral and so suggest that neither the hotel 
operational performance nor the shareholder’s performance increase after the 
acquisition of another hotel.  
After this introduction, the remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. 
In section 2 we review the existent empirical evidence related to this topic while in 
section 3 we present the methodology. In section 4 the sample collection process is 
explained while in section 5 are presented the results obtained. Finally, in section 6, 
conclusion, limitations and future references are depicted. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, we present an overview of the literature regarding the overall 
M&A post-acquisition performance and more precisely on the hotel and lodging post-
acquisition performance. 
 
2.1 M&A Performance 
Many studies tested whether M&A activity increases shareholders’ wealth 
around the announcement day and on the long-term. 
There is a unanimous consensus that shareholders of the target companies 
generally benefit from mergers and acquisitions, mainly due to the premium received by 
selling their shares3. 
On the contrary, the results obtained regarding acquirers’ post-acquisition 
returns are contradictory.Prior studies typically reported significantly negative long-
term results4 or found no abnormal returns on the long-term5.Very few studies found 
evidence of positive abnormal returns6 and only Malatesta (1983) and Yaghoubi et al. 
(2014) found evidence of negative abnormal returns on the short-term. Regarding the 
market sample, studies in the USA and the UK typically report slightly negative and 
insignificant abnormal returns for acquirers (Yaghoubi et. al., 2016). 
However, most of these studies have analysed the impact of M&A on stock 
returns and so it remains unclear whether acquiring firms profit from M&A in the long 
run.7 
                                               
3 For example, Asquith (1983), Malatesta (1983), Franks and Harris (1989), Firth (1980), Limmack 
(1991) and Franks et al. (1991). 
4 For example, Langetieg (1978), Asquith (1983), Agrawal et al. (1992), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Firth 
(1980), Limmack (1991), Buhner (1991), Kennedy and Limmack (1996), Gregory (1997), Loughran and 
Vijh (1997), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), Aw and Chatterjee (2004), 
Croci (2007) and Bouwman et al. (2009). 
5 For example, Franks et al. (1991), Loderer and Martin (1992), Franks et al. (1977), Dodd and Ruback 
(1977), Franks and Harris (1989), Higson and Elliott (1998), Chatterjee (2000), Datta et al. (2001), 
Andrade et al. (2001), Conn et al. (2004) and Gregory and McCorriston (2005). 
6 For example, Mandelker (1974), Moeller et al. (2004) and Healy et al. (1992).  
7 See annex 2 and 3. 
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2.2 Motives for Mergers and Acquisitions 
According to Yaghoubi et. al (2016), the motives for a merger or an acquisition 
can be gathered into four groups: managerial theories, industry-level theories, economic 
conditions and behavioural theories. 
First, the managerial theories state that managers of acquiring firms engage in 
mergers due to their overconfidence or self-interest and the post-merger performance is 
expected to decline. Examples of this are the agency theory and the management 
entrenchment hypothesis that states that value destroying acquisitions may be driven by 
self-interested managers (Morck et al., 1990) and the envious managers’ hypothesis that 
denotes that envious managers undertake value-destroying acquisitions but size-
enhancing acquisitions (Goel and Thakor, 2010).  
Second, the industry-level theories explained the existence of mergers and 
acquisitions to industry-level aspects, such as industry shocks or distribution of firm 
sizes within an industry. For instance, the economic disturbance theory indicates that 
economic shocks create divergences in valuation of stocks which consequently produce 
merger waves (Gort, 1969), the neoclassical theory (industry shocks hypothesis) that 
states that industry shocks that drive mergers could improve or deteriorate the industry 
firms (Harford, 2005; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996) and the ‘eat-or-be-eaten’ theory 
(merger anticipation hypothesis) suggested by Gorton et al. (2009) that states that a 
merger or acquisitions can be a defensive strategy resulting in merger waves that are 
expected to be value-destroying and harm the post-acquisition performance. 
Third, the economic conditions, such as the emergence of general-purpose 
technologies, the changes in anti-trust policies and the changes in bankruptcy 
regulations. For example, the Q theory of mergers that denotes that high-Q acquirers 
overall create higher profits announcement returns from mergers (Lang et al., 1989; 
Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002, 2008; Servaes, 1991) and the dynamic model of 
takeover activity presented by Toxvaerd (2008) indicating that the timing of merger 
activity should be determined by beneficial economic conditions and the risk of being 
anticipated by bidder competitors. 
Finally, the behavioural theories, that suggest that bidders take advantage of 
mispricing of stocks acquiring undervalued firms using their own overvalued stocks 
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(Shleifer and Vishny, 2003).  One evidence of the existence of theory market-driven 
mergers is that, according to several authors8 , stock acquisitions tends to produce 
negative results while cash acquisitions are expected to generate positive returns. 
Regarding the facts that significantly impact the mergers and acquisitions in the 
lodging industry, Kim and Olsen (1999) concluded that the most important objective of 
M&As in the lodging industry is to accelerate growth of the acquiring company, 
followed by the enhancement of stockholders' value. Next, the objectives are to expand 
capacity at less cost than constructing new hotel properties, then is to capture scale 
economies to save costs through the combination of two firms within an industry, to 
broaden the acquiring company's customer base by extending products and services 
(i.e., application of portfolio management, globalization), to improve credit capacity of 
resultant company and to achieve the personal goals, vision, and particular objectives of 
the acquiring company's chief executive. 
 
2.3 Hotel and Lodging Performance 
According to Kwansa (1994), the first empirical study ever conducted related 
with hotel and lodging industry mergers was done by Andrew (1988). His study tries to 
determine whether additional wealth accruing to shareholders of hospitality firms 
looking for diversify through acquisitions, during the period between 1975 and 1986. 
His conclusions showed that the acquiring hospitality firms lost value during the 20 
days prior to the acquisitions announcement, differing from the target firms that gained 
value during the same period (Andrew, 1988) (Apud Kwansa, 1994). 
 
2.3.1 Short-Term Studies9 
Kwansa (1994) examined the wealth earned by shareholders of target lodging 
firms in the 1980s using a sample of 18 hotel firms. The results show that the 
shareholders of target hotels benefited from the acquisition announcements, with a total 
                                               
8 For example, Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003). 
9 See annex 4. 
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CAR equal to 31.5% and significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level of 
significance through the event window. 
Canina (2001) extended the sample data studied by Kwansa (1994) through 
1999 and analysed mergers and tender offers separately. Her research covered 
stockholders of both acquiring and target companies, involving both public and private 
firms in the hotel and hotel real estate investment trust (REIT) industries. The results 
showed positive abnormal returns in the merger announcement day for both acquirers 
(1.3%) and targets (8.9%) in the lodging industry. Moreover, the reaction to tender 
offers announcements compared to mergers announcements is significantly greater for 
both acquirers (3.6% compared to 0.9%) and targets (14.1% compared to 5.6%). 
Using the same methodology used by Sheel and Nagpal (2000), Hsu and Jang 
(2006) investigated the financial performance of acquiring firms in the lodging industry 
between 1985 and 2000. The sample size for the market measure analysis comprised 15 
acquiring firms and the empirical findings indicated no abnormal returns for the 
acquiring firms in the short-term.  
Kim (2006) examined the short-term post-acquisition performance of both 
acquirers and target firms in the hotel and restaurant industries between 1980 and 2004, 
using event study method. The results found negative returns for the acquiring hotel 
firms (CAR-10+10 = -17.05) and positive returns for the target hotel firms (CAR-10+10 = 
33.26) around acquisition announcements. 
Kim et al. (2008), using the same data sample and the event study approach of 
Kim (2006), found a little increase in the shareholders’ value of acquiring hotel firms 
(CAR-10+10 = 24.7%) and positive returns for the shareholders of the target hotel firms 
(CAR-10+10 = 116.9%) around acquisition announcements. Nevertheless, the descriptive 
statistics indicated that M&A announcements have a little positive impact on both target 
and acquirers despite the fact they are not statistically significant. 
More recently, Ma et al. (2011) examined the stock performance of 452 firms 
acquiring listed and unlisted lodging firms between 1981 and 2006. The empirical 
findings showed that shareholders’ value of acquiring lodging firms increases on 
average, acquiring unlisted lodging firms creates more value than acquiring a listed one, 
managers should acquire the largest unlisted lodging firms and acquisitions should be 
paid mostly in stock. 
  
 
 
7 
Chatfield et al. (2012) studied the returns around announcements period to 
measure the impact of payment method in the success of hospitality mergers and 
acquisitions. Their sample comprised 282 bidding public hospitality firms from 1985 to 
2004. The authors generally concluded that shareholders of acquiring firms gain 
positive and significant returns when M&As are paid by cash and that stock or mixed 
payments produce returns that are not statistically different from zero, as opposed to the 
findings of Ma et al. (2011). 
 
2.3.2 Long-Term Studies10 
Differing from the previous studies, Sheel and Nagpal (2000) analysed the long-
term impact of acquisitions on the shareholders’ value of acquiring firms in the 
hospitality industry for the period from 1980 to 2000. Overall, the CAR decreased 
significantly in the long-term (CAR+36month = -176.76%) and the total CAR for the 
acquiring firms was found to be negative, indicating that shareholders of acquiring 
hospitality firms gained negative abnormal returns after mergers and acquisitions. 
Hsu and Jang (2006) investigated also the long-term financial performance of 
acquiring firms in the lodging industry between 1985 and 2000. They employed 
accounting measures, including Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) 
to access the overall (long-term) operating performance of the acquirers and the sample 
size comprised 23 firms. The empirical findings from this study showed that ROA, 
ROE and the long-term shareholders’ value of acquiring firms declined significantly 
after mergers. Accordingly, this study found no abnormal returns for the acquiring 
lodging firms, showing financial deterioration after mergers, which is consistent with 
the findings of Sheel and Nagpal (2000). 
Kim (2006) examined also the long-term (3-year and 5-year) post-acquisition 
performance of both acquirers and target firms in the hotel and restaurant industries 
between 1980 and 2004, using accounting-based measures. The results found no 
statistical differences in terms of profitability and efficiency and the growth rate of 
acquiring firms decreased significantly after mergers and acquisitions, indicating that 
shareholders of acquiring firms do not benefit from mergers and acquisitions. 
                                               
10 See annex 5. 
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Yang et al. (2009) investigated the long-term performance of 19 acquiring hotel 
firms from 1996 to 2007. This study aims to find how the financing method affects the 
returns in the long-term. The results showed that hotel industry acquirers gain positive 
abnormal returns 12 months’ post-acquisition and that the method of payment have no 
impact in the post-acquisition returns for the acquirer firms.  
Finally, Kim and Canina (2013) analysed the acquisition premiums and 
performance improvements for the targets and acquirers in the lodging industry between 
1991 and 2009. Differently from the previous studies, they used a selection model and 
then a multivariate regression. Nonetheless, this study was not able to link the 
announcement returns and realized performance improvements in post-acquisition 
period. They reach the conclusion that if the premium was excessive relative to the 
acquirer’s synergy gain, the acquirer would have experienced a negative announcement 
return while the target would have experienced a positive return due to the premium 
(Kim and Canina, 2003). 
 
2.3.3 Literature Gap 
While there is a significant body of research in the M&A performance there is 
only a scarce number of studies regarding the performance of hotel and lodging 
companies. 
There is an agreement that targets’ post-acquisition performance is positive 
(Kwansa, 1994; Canina, 2001; Kim, 2006; Kim et al., 2008), nonetheless, regarding the 
acquirers’ post-acquisition performance the results are mixed. Some studies found 
evidence that acquirers gained from M&A activity (Canina, 2001; Yang et al., 2009; Ma 
et al., 2011; Chatfield et al., 2012) while others found the opposite (Sheel and Nagpal, 
2000; Hsu and Jang, 2006; Kim, 2006; Kim et al., 2008). 
Most of these studies have analysed the short-term impact of mergers on equity 
returns using only stock market returns around the announcement (Kwansa, 1994; Sheel 
and Nagpal, 2000; Canina, 2001; Kim et al., 2008; Ma et al., 2011; Chatfield et al., 
2012), while the long-term influence of mergers on equity value of acquiring firms in 
the hotel and lodging industry has been reasonably ignored. 
The studies using accounting-based measures have analysed a short amount of 
data that is not sufficient to generate a conclusive investigation. Sheel and Nagpal 
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(2000) sample comprised 21 firms, Hsu and Jang (2006) studied 23 firms, Yang et al. 
(2009) studied 19 firms and Kim (2006) only analysed a sample of 5 hotel firms.  
Many researchers have been criticising the use of only stock market measures to 
define the success or failure of the M&As since the changes in the stock prices around 
the announcement days do not reveal the real benefits from the mergers (Dickerson  et 
al., 1997; Scherer, 1988). Nevertheless, the accounting-based measures are somewhat 
limited because it takes an extant number of years until it reflects in profitability the 
effects of the merger. Additionally, this measure has the shortcoming of not isolating 
the effect of a specific event such as a merger (Biggadike, 1979; Lubatkin, 1983). 
Considering the mixed information available concerning post-acquisition 
performance of the hotel and lodging industry, it is appropriate to investigate it with 
newly available data, with the proper stringent methodology that strives to capture the 
true effects of M&As, particularly on the long-term performance and to use a bigger 
sample to allow us to make statistical significant conclusions. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
The performance measures discussed in this section are divided into two groups 
based on the literature review. One is the market-based performance measures and the 
other is the accounting-based performance measures, with the first relying on market 
data and the latter on accounting information (Gross, 2007). In this study, we are going 
to analyse the short-term impact of M&A deals in shareholders’ wealth performing an 
event study based on the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) around the 
announcement day and the long-term impact through a univariate and a multivariate 
analysis using accounting data. 
 
3.1 Short-Term Measures 
The market-based performance (or financial performance) analysis measures the 
reaction of stock prices of acquirers and targets to merger announcements (Rhoades, 
1994). The main method used is the event study (or residual analysis). This method 
studies the stock price behaviour around specific events and the reaction to such events 
(Binder, 1998), i.e., it captures the wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions. 
Essentially, the event study method isolates an event that has occurred in a firm 
from all other events and measures its effect on stock price, since the stock prices 
quickly reflect all available information. According to Kwansa (1994, p. 18): 
 “This is accomplished by first predicting what would 
ordinarily have happened to share price in the absence of the event. 
This value represents the “normal” return to the stock and it is 
compared to what actually happens to the share price during the period 
when the event is unfolding. The difference between these two values 
constitutes the “abnormal” return or the additional wealth created for 
the shareholder as a result of the event.” 
Therefore, the event study approach compares the stock price performance 
against an estimation of expected (or normal) return based on prior performance. Then, 
it is concluded that shareholders value is affected by mergers and acquisitions 
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(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
announcements when the observed and the expected returns are statistically different 
from each other (Kim et al., 2008). 
The market model is founded on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and 
exploits the ordinary least square estimator. Furthermore, when measuring the excess 
returns the market model considers the past performance of the stock and the sensitivity 
to the overall market changes (Kim et al., 2008). 
 
3.1.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The difference between the actual return (")	and the expected (or normal) return (%(")), for each day and company, represent the effect of the announcement bid, the 
abnormal return (&"): &" = " − %(") 
The expected (or normal) return of the stock, according to the market model, is 
written as: %(")*) 	= 	+) 	+ 	-)".*	
where: 
E(Ri,t) - expected return of the share of acquiring firm i on day t; 
αi - intercept, measure of the average return of shares of acquiring firm i that is 
not explained by the market return during the moment t;  
βi - coefficient or slope, measure of the sensibility of the volatility of shares of 
acquiring firm i towards the market volatility;
Rm,t - return of the market index at day t. 
 
The daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal return should fluctuate 
around zero since the daily abnormal return is the mean of the difference between the 
actual returns and the expected returns. Otherwise, it is concluded that the 
announcement event influenced stock price valuations of the market (Peterson, 1989; 
Armitage, 1995; MacKinlay, 1997). Accordingly, the daily abnormal returns are 
calculated as: &")* = ")*	– 	%(")*) 	= 	")*	– 	+)	– 	-0"12 
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(4) 
(5) 
where: 
ARit - abnormal return of the share of acquiring firm i for day t; 
Rit - observed or actual return of the share of acquiring firm i for day t; 
E(Rit) - estimated return of the share of acquiring firm i for day t which is 
derived from the equation (2). 
 
Using the equation (3), the abnormal return for each event day is then averaged 
across all companies in the sample to calculate the cumulative abnormal return	(3&")) 
of a certain event window since the day 2 = 1 until the last day of the window: 3&") = &")*5*67   
Lastly, to have the impact of the bid announcement in the shareholders’ wealth, 
the cumulative abnormal returns are summed over the event window period and divided 
by the total number of firms in the sample (8). Then, we obtain the cumulative average 
abnormal returns (3&&") of all acquiring firms, using the following formula: 3&&" = 9:;<=>?@5   
An important concern to take into account in this method is the decision of the 
event window period, since it captures the effect of mergers on the stock prices (Kim et 
al., 2008; Martynova et al., 2011). However, the event window period that should be 
used is not consensual. In addition to the possible abnormal returns after the 
announcement day it is also essential to analyse if there are also possible abnormal 
returns before the announcement day, since some information may be revealed through 
rumours or private information (Martynova et al., 2011). With a very small event 
window we might ignore information published before the announcement in media, 
while a lengthy window might mistakenly include former positive movements in the 
acquiring firm’s stock price. We have considered several event windows ([-10; +5], [-
10; -5], [-5; 0] and [0; +5]) to reduce biases and improve the analysis of the impact of 
M&A. 
Regarding the market model parameters, the Ordinary Least Squares (hereafter 
OLS) method is going to be used to estimate them for each firm. The parameters + and - were estimated using market returns and realized share returns over the pre-event 
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(8) 
(9) 
(6) 
(7) 
period. We used the MSCI World Index as a proxy of the market return as our sample 
includes acquiring firms listed in different indexes worldwide. Our estimation window 
has 251 days (from day –262 to –11). It is important to have an extensive estimation 
window since it is presumed that the market model parameters are constant throughout 
the event window and the estimation period. The OLS regression uses the estimators ")*	 and ".*	 during the estimation window that were obtained using a logarithm 
transformation to approximate the returns to normality (Henderson, 1990):  
")* = AB	 C*C*D7  ".* = AB	 E>E>F@   
where: C* - market price of the share of acquiring firm I on day t;C*D7- market price of the share of acquiring firm i on the day before day t; G	- Index value on day t;G*D7- Index value on the day before day t.  
 
The expected returns were also estimated using the Market-adjusted model 
(MAM) and the Constant Mean Return model (CMRM). The market-adjusted model is 
a market model with restrictions (MacKinlay, 1997) but is more simple as the effect of 
the general market in the stock market price (normal or expected return) is not adjusted 
for the company risk and so the expected return is equal to the market return (+ = 0 and - = 1): %("),*) = ".,* 
Regarding the CMRM, this model considers that the expected return of each 
acquirer’s share is equal to the historical mean over the estimation period: %("),*) = ;<,>>?F@@>?FJKJLM7   
According to Brown and Warner (1985), besides the fact of the CMRM being 
considered simple and very restrictive, when compared to other more complex models 
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the results not diverge from one another, which makes it a useful model to be applied in 
this dissertation. 
To test the significance of the abnormal returns obtained a parametric test is 
going to be used. If the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) have a normal 
distribution and are independently and identically distributed over time, the test 
statistics for the null hypothesis has a t-Student distribution (Brown and Warner, 1985). 
The rejection of the null hypothesis (H0: CAAR = 0) verifies if the event had impact for 
shareholders.  3&&"~8 0, O  2P*Q* = 9::;R 9:;   
S 3&" = 75D7 (3&") − 3&&")L5)67   
where:2T2U2 - t-student test statistic with B-2 degrees of freedom for the 
market model;
 3&&" - cumulative average abnormal returns;3&"0 - cumulative abnormal return of firm i, i = 1, ..., N;8 - total number of acquiring firms with available abnormal returns;S 3&"  - standard deviation of 3&" , an unbiased estimator of standard 
deviation of population (O).  
 
To better interpret the findings, we will also use a non-parametric test the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon, 1945) to test the statistical significance of the 
CAR parameter. The non-parametric test is less demanding on the sample behaviour but 
is not affected by outliers, therefore it produces robust results. According to Serra 
(2004), this test considers that both the sign and the magnitude of abnormal returns are 
fundamental so, this non-parametric test considers the absolute value of abnormal 
returns (V0:	1XY0UB	 = 	0) and the test statistics is assumed to approximately follow a 
normal distribution when the number of observations is large:  Z~8 0, O  
(12) 
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%(Z) = 5(5[7)\   OL(Z) = 5(5[7)(L5[7)L\   Z = ])5)67   
where:Z - statistics for the Mann-Whitney rank test;]) - abnormal return for the observation i;8 - number of observations i in a certain event window. 
 
3.2 Long-Term Measures 
The event study methodology can be used to examine both short and long-term 
abnormal performance, however, several concerns arise when it is used to analyse the 
long-term performance (Andrade et al., 2001; Martynova et al., 2008). For instance, the 
statistical significance of the findings vary according the type of benchmark model used 
and on the long-term shareholders’ gains are affected by several different factors which 
makes it difficult to isolate the M&A effect (Campa and Hernando, 2004). If we 
consider that the markets are efficient, in the long-term the abnormal returns may not 
exist, resulting in the total abnormal performance being, on average, the period over the 
announcement event (Franks et al., 1991).  
To study the long-term performance of a M&A, we will apply, alternatively, a 
methodology that used an operating/accounting performance measure as benchmark for 
the success/failure of the acquisition. This method considers the accounting data before 
and after the deal and examines the changes in the acquiring firm performance. The 
acquiring firm’s cash flow is expected to be impacted when the expected gains at the 
deal announcement are realized, implying value generation to the firm (Andrade et al., 
2001). 
The operating performance approach allows the investigator to concentrate on 
costs and efficiency, which has the advantage of focusing on real observed operating 
effects rather than the expectations over the announcement period. 
There are also some problems inherent to this methodology, like the fact that 
studies using this method generally analyses operating performance over long periods 
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after the M&A deal and through all the period, many factors may impact the firm’s 
efficiency or general performance that is not related to the merger itself. Still, this 
problem may be mitigated by being considered in the sample design or by including 
independent variables that control for those factors in the multiple regression model.  
The most used measures to capture the operating performance in previous post-
acquisition studies are the return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE) (e.g., 
Pilloff, 1996; Ikeda and Doi, 1983; Cornett and Tehranian, 1992 ). The cash flow return 
is also an important measure to evaluate a firm’s performance (Healy et al., 1992; 
Cornett and Tehranian, 1992). 
Having in consideration previous studies and particularly Martynova et al. 
(2006), we will compare the firms’ performance in the year before the deal (year -1) to 
the firms’ performance in the three following years after the deal (year 1, 2 and 3), as a 
three-year period is considered the appropriate to reflect the impacts from a M&A. The 
deal year (year 0) is going to be excluded from the analysis for being affected by several 
other factors related to the deal operation and for including periods before and after the 
deal that might affect the results.  
We will divide our operational performance analysis of hotel and lodging firms 
in two parts. First, we will start by comparing the evolution of our sample of firms 
(univariate analysis) with (and without) controlling for differences between companies 
that have done and companies that have not been involved in a M&A. After, we will use 
a multivariate analysis, specifically the difference-in-difference.  
 
3.2.1 Univariate Analysis 
 To access the change of each relevant performance variables considered from 
the year before the deal to the three years after it, the following formula is going to be 
used: 
^<>_`D^<>F@^<>F@   
where: a - operational performance variable; 0 - acquiring firm; 
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2-1 - previous year of the deal; b - year after the acquisition for which we want to calculate the change of the 
performance measure (year 1, 3 and 3). 
 
The variables considered in this analysis are going to be the total assets, EBIT 
and revenues. 
In the case of the operational performance measures calculated as ratios (c), 
such as ROA, EBIT margin and Asset turnover will be estimated in changes in 
percentage points using the following formula:  c)*[d − c)*D7 
The performance measures that are going to be used to analyse the performance 
of the acquiring firms are calculated as following: 
"e& = %fGgUTTX2T &TTX2	gh]BijX] = PQklPQPPl*P  %fGg	mU]n0B = opEqPQklP  
Since the change in the operational performance measures can be explained by 
the change in the industry, to isolate the acquisition effect, we will control for the 
industry change, by subtracting our variable by the change observed in a similar 
company that had not been engaged in a merger and acquisition (control group). The 
difference will represent the adjusted impact, according to Healy et al. (1992). 
To test whether the average difference before and after the acquisition is 
statistically different form zero, once again we will use the t-student test (parametric 
test) and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (non-parametric test) that, as referred before, is 
not affected by the outliers making the results more robust and consistent.  
 
3.2.2 Multivariate Analysis 
To further analyse the long-term impact of an acquisition, a multivariate analysis 
is going to be used in this dissertation. The impact of an acquisition on the performance 
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of an hotel and lodging firm is defined as the difference between the firm’s outcome 
when involved in an acquisition and the outcome that this firm would have if it had not 
been involved in an acquisition. This allows us to determine what would have been the 
hotel firm’s performance if it had not been involved in an acquisition. In order to 
analyse this effect, the difference-in-difference (DID) approach is going to be used 
(Meyer, 1994; Heckman et al., 1997). In this approach, we compare the difference in the 
performance before and after the operation for the acquirer hotel firms to that in the 
outcome before and after this operation for a control group. This control group is 
comprised with hotel firms that were not involved in any acquisition. By doing this 
comparison, we can control for other factors that could have influenced the performance 
of the acquiring firms. One example of this is the elimination of the variations in the 
economic situation that could be wrongly attributed to an acquisition, since it is 
assumed that a variation in the economic situation affects all hotel firms in an identical 
way. 
The effect of an acquisition is going to be determined using the following 
formula: r)*7 − r)*s 
where: 
- r)*7	is the outcome in period 2 (after the acquisition) for an hotel firm 0 which has 
been involved in an acquisition; 
- r)*s	is the outcome for the same hotel firm if it was not subject to an acquisition, 
in the same period 2. 
 
When regressing the data collected across the two groups of firms (acquirers and 
non-acquirers), we reach to the following formula: r)* = -s + -7tUuvh0]0Bn) 	+ -LtwiT2* 	+ -xtUuvh0]0Bn) ∗ twiT2*+ -\ log gi2UA	&TTX2T + })* 
The performance of an hotel firm will be determined by the ROA, EBIT margin 
and asset turnover. tUuvh0]0Bn)	is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for acquiring hotel 
firms and 0 otherwise. It controls for differences in constant performance between the 
  
 
 
19 
acquiring hotel firm and the control group. The dummy variable	twiT2* was defined as 
taking the value 1 in the post acquiring years and 0 otherwise, for both acquiring and 
non-acquiring firms. The term tUuvh0]0Bn) ∗ twiT2*  is an interaction term between tUuvh0]0Bn)	and twiT2*. Its coefficient -x	represents the DID estimator of the effect 
of acquiring on the group of the acquiring firms (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Difference-in-difference estimator. 
 Before After Difference 
Acquiring Firms -s + -7 + -\ -s + -7 + -L + -x + -\ ~ + ~Ä 
Control Group -s + -\ -s + -L + -\ ~ 
Difference ~Å ~Å + ~Ä ~Ä 
 
In each variable, the model is going to be first estimated considering the all three 
years after the operation, i.e., it will compare the period after the operation with the 
period before and then each year after the operation will be considered individually. 
The model will also include the variable Ain gi2UA	&TTX2T  to control for the 
companies’ size and verify the robustness of the conclusions.  
The selection process of the control group will be explained in the next chapter.  
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4. DATA COLLECTION 
A sample containing all 417 successful mergers and acquisitions, occurred 
between 1997 and 2016, that both the acquirer and the target were hotels or similar 
accommodation and the acquirer was a listed company, at the time of the deal, was 
selected from Zephyr, Bureau Van Dijk, a comprehensive M&A database for all deals 
occurred in the world. After excluding deals involving the acquisition of less than 50% 
of the target capital and deals where the target’s total assets represent less than 10% of 
the acquiring’s total assets (in order to guarantee the significance of the transaction to 
the acquiring company), our sample was reduced to 54 deals.  
In the case a firm acquired more than one company during one-year period only 
the first deal was considered. To analyse the impact in the operational performance of 
the acquiring firms, we need to measure the change of the operational performance 
indicators between the year before the transaction [-1] and the three following years [-1, 
+3] and so deals where accounting data for the acquiring company was not available for 
the year before the transaction and for at least one year after the transactions were also 
dropped. Our final sample is so composed by a total of 32 observations. The number of 
deals by year are presented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Sample - number of deals by year. 
Source: Zephyr. 
 
Table 2 show the number of deals by world region. 
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Table 2. Sample – number of firms by world region. 
Source: Zephyr. 
World Region No. Firms 
Africa 2 
Asia 9 
Europe 2 
European Union 16 
Northern America 1 
Oceania 2 
Total 32 
 
Subsequently, when collecting the accounting information from Thomson 
Reuters, three deals had to be eliminated due to the lack of information. For the 
financial performance analysis, six more deals were dropped due to the huge illiquidity 
nature of the share in stock market. Therefore, we end up with with 29 deals in our 
sample for the operating performance analysis and 25 deals for the financial 
performance analysis. 
 
4.1 Control Group 
The control group was selected through the application of a matching method. 
The objective of this method is to select a group of companies similar to the acquiring 
companies before the acquisition but that they were not involved in a M&A deal. So, 
each company in our sample was paired with another that is the most alike as possible, 
but which have not been involved in an acquisition. This control group allow us to 
analyse the results of both acquiring and non-acquiring firms and eliminate the 
variations caused by external factors such as the economic situation which is assumed 
to affect all hotel firms in an identical way. Whilst, without a control group the possible 
external factors outcomes could be wrongly attributed to the result of an acquisition. 
The purpose of this method is to find a proxy for the change that any firm in our sample 
would have if they were not involved in the acquisition of another hotel as they had. 
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To accomplish this objective, we choose firms from the hotel and lodging 
industry that were not involved in any M&A transactions and have similar size 
(measured by the total assets) and operating performance (measured by the ROA) of 
each firm in our sample, in the year before the acquisition. 
From the initial 1,523 listed firms from the Travel and Leisure industry collected 
from the Thomson Reuters Datastream, we chose, for each firm in our sample, the firms 
that have an amount of total assets around 95 and 105% of the total assets of the firms 
in our sample, in the year before the acquisition. From those companies, we selected the 
company with the nearest ROA. 
Finally, after selecting 29 non-acquiring firms, together with the 29 acquiring 
firms involved in an M&A operation, our final sample of the accounting-based measure 
methodology is composed by 58 firms in total. 
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5. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, the descriptive statistics for both the acquiring companies 
(acquiring group) and the control companies (control group) are going to be presented 
in the year before the acquisition (year -1).  
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 exhibits the differences between the acquiring group and the control 
group in the period before the acquisition. 
Observing Table 3, it can be seen the difference between the mean and median 
of all variables is significant, suggesting the presence of a wide range of firm sizes and 
the presence of outliers. Consequently, the analysis on this dissertation will be centred 
mainly on the median since, in the presence of outliers, it reflects a more realistic idea 
of a ‘central measure’ than the average. 
As shown in Table 3, the sales of the acquiring group were 22% lower than the 
control group. However, the EBIT of acquiring group was 20% higher when compared 
with the control group. Nonetheless, as expected (since was one the criteria used to 
choose the control group) the amount of total assets of both groups, in the period before 
the acquisition, is the same. 
Moreover, none of these differences is statistically significant before the 
acquisition and so we can conclude that the companies from the acquiring group and 
from the control group are similar. 
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Table 3. Financial statement main variables - Comparison between the two 
groups. 
This table reports the summary statistics for the sample of 29 firms for the acquiring group plus 
29 firms for the control group. The sample period begins in 1999 and ends in 2015. The variables sales, 
EBIT and total assets are referred to the year before the acquisition. All values presented are in millions 
of US dollars. All differences between the acquiring group and the control group are not statistical 
significant. Source: own calculations. 
 Acquiring Group Control Group 
Panel A: Sales   
  Mean ($ million) 599.5  561.9 
  Median ($ million) 87,9 113.2 
Panel B: EBIT 
    Mean ($ million) 95.4 73.6
  Median ($ million) 16.5 13.7 
Panel C: Total Assets 
    Mean ($ million) 1,108.1 1,111. 8
  Median ($ million)  306.0  305.5 
 
5.2 Firms’ Operating Performance Before the Deal 
Table 4 displays the differences between the acquiring group and the control 
group for the firms’ operating performance before the acquisition. 
As it can be seen in the table 4, there is a difference in the ROA median results 
with a significance level of 5% indicating that the acquiring group was more profitable 
when using their assets to generate earnings than the control group. This was mainly 
due to a better EBIT margin as the acquiring group presents a worse asset turnover ratio 
than the control group. These are significant at 1% and 10% confidence level 
respectively, although in the case of the turnover ratio just for the average (t-test). The 
higher EBIT margin from the acquiring group compared to the control group indicates 
that the acquiring firms have higher earnings ability that could be mainly due to more 
efficient cost management or better revenue management. However, a lower turnover 
ratio in the acquiring group suggest that they are not using their assets as 
productively/efficiently as the control group. 
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Table 4. Firms' performance in the year before the acquisition- Comparison 
between the two groups. 
This table reports the summary statistics for the sample of 29 firms for the acquiring group plus 
29 firms for the control group. The sample period begins in 1999 and ends in 2015. The variables ROA, 
EBIT margin and asset turnover are referred to the year before the acquisition. ROA is the return-on-
assets ratio computed as EBIT over total assets. EBIT margin ratio was computed as EBIT over sales. 
Asset turnover ratio was computed as sales over total assets. The acquiring group and the control group 
columns are presented in percentage. The difference column is presented in percentage points. Source: 
own calculations. The classification ***, **, * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% significance level.  
  Acquiring Group Control Group Difference 
ROA   (p.p.)  
  Mean (%) 7.44 6.21 0.01  
  Median (%) 6.11 4.93 0.01 ** 
EBIT Margin   (p.p.)  
 Mean (%) 20.80 12.36 0.08 *** 
 Median (%) 20.01 12.90 0.07 *** 
Asset Turnover   (p.p.)  
  Mean (%) 48.30 86.10 -0.38 * 
  Median (%) 41.62 43.33 -0.02  
 
 
In sum, even though the acquiring firms and the control group firms are similar 
(by construction), before the acquisition, in terms of size and ROA, the acquiring firms 
were more profitable (although slightly less efficient) in that year. This higher 
profitability may have led to the decision of acquiring another company from the same 
industry since higher profitability means more cash flow and more confidence in the 
management competence.  
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6. RESULTS 
In this chapter, it will be presented the results achieved by the application of the 
different methodologies mentioned previously to answer the dissertation main question: 
Does hotel operational and shareholder’s performance increase after acquiring another 
hotel? 
 
6.1 Short-Term 
Table 5 show the abnormal returns for the shareholders around the 
announcement day over the following event windows: [-10, +5], [-10, -5], [-5, 0] and [0, 
+5]. 
The results show that for the entire window ([-10, +5]) the cumulative abnormal 
return is positive for all models but is never statistically significant which suggest that 
the acquisition of another company of the hotel and lodging industry did not produce 
any wealth gains for the acquiring shareholders. 
However, when looking only for the window of [-10, -5], the results suggest that 
before the announcement day the market generally expects that an acquisition would be 
announced and that the acquisition would benefit the bidder shareholders as the 
cumulative abnormal return is positive and statistically significant during that period, 
for all models. 
Then, the results also suggest that after the announcement of the acquisition, the 
investor were not anymore expecting the deal would create value to the bidder 
shareholders as the cumulative abnormal return is negative for the window [0, +5], for 
all models. Although the values are not statistically significant, they are enough to 
cancel the positive trend that occurred in the window [-10, -5]. Consequently, it is not 
possible to reject H0 and to state that M&A operations that occurred since 1999 created 
or destroyed value to acquiring shareholders of the hotel and lodging industry.  
The evidence of insignificant effects on the wealth of bidder shareholders is also 
reported by Kim et al. (2008) and Hsu and Jan (2006).  
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Table 5. Cumulate abnormal returns. 
This table reports the cumulative average abnormal share returns (CAAR) for acquirers 
calculated over the announcement period, which is calculated from day -10 to day +5, where day 0 is the 
announcement day. The columns 2 to 4 present shorter event windows amongst the announcement period. 
The abnormal return is calculated relative to the Market Index. Source: own calculations. MM = market 
model; MAM = market-adjusted model; CMRM = constant mean return model. The classification ***, 
**, * denotes for 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. 
  Event Window 
  [-10; +5] [-10; -5] [-5; 0] [0; +5] 
Panel A: MM      
CAAR (%) 0.41 2.24  -0.74 -1.57 
Parametric test 0.759 0.134  0.393 0.188 
Signed-rank test 0.696 0.065 * 0.427 0.326 
N 25 25  25 25 
Panel B: MAM      
CAAR (%) 1.31 2.29  -0.11 -1.27 
Parametric test 0.342 0.108  0.910 0.308 
Signed-rank test 0.300 0.026 ** 0.638 0.476 
N 25 25  25 25 
Panel C: CMRM      
CAAR (%) 0.72 2.82  -0.91 -1.86 
Parametric test 0.611 0.025 ** 0.298 0.181 
Signed-rank test 0.419 0.045 ** 0.427 0.346 
N 25 25  25 25 
 
 
This conclusion can be confirmed when looking to Figure II that depicts the 
cumulative average abnormal returns from the 10th day before the announcement until 
5th day after. First, when analysing [-10, -5] period of the event, it can be seen that the 
acquiring firms are over performing the market as the abnormal cumulative returns 
become positive. Clearly, there is an increase in the stock prices in that period before 
the acquisition (change that is also statistically significant as seen before). This increase 
in CAARs may be a result of information leakage inside the market regarding the 
intention of the hotel and lodging firms to acquire another hotel, thus investors predict a 
positive effect in the company value. This period is followed by a 5-day period of 
stagnation of the stock prices where the market waits for the announcement rumours to 
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be confirmed. After this period, when there is the confirmation and the information is 
released, the cumulative returns decrease and the cumulative abnormal return tends to 
zero. This result suggest that after the announcement the market changes its 
interpretation as more evidence regarding the deal operation is unveiled and investors 
are able to make more concrete examinations to the deal outcomes. The evidence 
indicate that the investors end up considering the deal as neutral (neither value created 
or destroyed) since all the accumulated value is lost after the announcement.  
 
Figure II. Evolution of CAARs around the announcement day. 
This figure presents the CAARs around the announcement day [-10, +5] for the different models 
applied in this dissertation. The announcement day is the day 0. MM = market model; MAM = market-
adjusted model; CMRM = constant mean return model. Source: own calculations. 
 
 
6.2 Long-Term 
6.2.1 Univariate Analysis 
In the univariate analysis, the change of each individual variable and ratio will 
be examined in order to understand the impact of acquisitions in the hotel and lodging 
industry on the operational performance. 
As before, we will focus particularly on the median results in order to exclude 
the effects of outliers presented in our sample. 
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The raw and adjusted change for the different variables will be computed from 
the period before the acquisition to the average of the three years after plus the post 
years individually. The adjusted change will be computed by subtracting the sector 
median change in the performance measure to the change in the performance measure 
of the acquiring firms. This procedure removes the macroeconomic factors that may 
affect the results of both groups equally.  
 
6.2.1.1 Main Variables  
Observing the Panel A in Table 6, it is possible to see that the sales of the 
acquiring firms increase after the acquisition and although the change in all three years 
is statistically significant, the effect tends to decline over time. Moreover, when 
adjusted by the change in the sales of the control group, the change is not significant 
anymore. This suggests that the change in the sales after the acquisition is, at least, 
partly explained by the sector change during the same period. These results seem to be 
contradictory, since it is expected that after a merger or acquisition, the sales of any 
entity (hotels or not) would increase. These results differ from the findings of Kim 
(2006) that surprisingly found negative and statistically significant change in sales. 
Regarding the EBIT, Panel B in Table 6 show that the change (raw and 
adjusted) after the acquisition is mainly negative but not statistically significant. These 
results indicate that the acquisition of firms in the hotel and lodging industry do not 
affect the operating profit of the acquiring firms. 
The change observed in the total assets after the acquisition is very similar to the 
change observed in the sales. However, the adjusted change of the acquiring group is 
statistically significant at the first year after the acquisition and for the average of the 
three years after the acquisition (Panel C, Table 6). This positive effect in the total 
assets variable is expected since when a firm acquires another it also acquires some (if 
not all) of the target firm’s assets. 
Generally, we can say that acquisition of hotel and lodging firms have a positive 
effect on both the acquiring sales and total assets, as expected.  
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Table 6. Main variable change. 
This table displays the change of three variables analysed in this study. In order to know if the 
change of the variables is significant or not, we did the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for the median 
results. The mean results are not presented since they are affected by the presence of outliers. The 
adjusted median change is given by the median change subtracted by the industry change that may affect 
the results of both groups equally. In the first column, the change of the three years after the acquisition in 
relation to the year before is presented. In the following columns, the change of the first, second and third 
years after the acquisition in relation to the year before is displayed. Source: own calculations. The 
classification *, **, ***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level for 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. 
  From -1 to 3y From -1 to +1 From -1 to +2 From -1 to +3 
Panel A: Sales         
  Median change (%) 26.17 *** 24.28 *** 22.16 ** 11.79 ** 
  Adjusted Median change (%) 6.45  -0.59  -1.45  -0.11  
Panel B: EBIT         
  Median change (%) -7.04  4.23  -10.18  -16.00  
  Adjusted Median change (%) -2.90  -2.13  -7.12  -2.46  
Panel C: Total Assets         
  Median change (%) 47.98 *** 30.11 *** 14.23 *** 17.41 *** 
  Adjusted Median change (%) 15.28 ** 16.35 *** 6.51  1.53  
 
6.2.1.2 Performance Measures 
Table 7 presents the change after the acquisition of the performance ratios: 
return-on-assets (ROA), EBIT margin and asset turnover ratios. 
Analysing first the ROA ratio, table 7 show that the median changes are 
negative and statistically significant for the first and second year after the acquisition 
and for the three-year average after the acquisition. When comparing these results to the 
adjusted median changes, they are very similar. This suggests that the acquisitions do 
not generate positive effects in the performance of the acquiring hotel and lodging 
firms. These results are consistent with Hsu and Jang (2006) that indicate that three 
years after the acquisition, the ROA is lower than before and so the results indicate 
acquisition have a declining effect on the performance of the hotel and lodging firms. 
These evidence is, however, not consistent with the findings of Kim (2006). 
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Table 7 also show that the change of the EBIT margin, in the three years after 
the acquisition is negative and statistically significant, even when adjusting for the 
change in the control group change. This suggests that the acquisition affect negatively 
the acquiring firms, perhaps due to higher integration costs. 
Regarding the asset turnover ratio (Panel C, Table 7), there is negative but not 
statistically significant change after the acquisition. This ratio measures of how 
effectively a firm generates sales form its assets, therefore a lower ratio is negative 
impact of the acquiring firm’s operating performance. Therefore, these results indicate 
that the acquiring firms, after the acquisition are not using their assets in an efficiently 
manner. These evidence is also not consistent with the findings of Kim (2006). 
Essentially, the acquisition has a negative impact on the profitability of the firm. 
This negative change can be due to the acquisition itself or it can be simply a 
consequence of the good (punctual) performance verified in the previous year of the 
acquisition. Nonetheless, if it was due to the former, the acquisition should not have 
been finalized since it has worsened the profitability of the acquiring firms, if not the 
higher profitability of the acquiring firms was not a sign of a better management team, 
and so should not have been the reason for the acquisition. 
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Table 7. Main ratio change. 
This table displays the change of three variables analysed in this study. In order to know if the 
change of the variables is significant or not, we did the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for the median 
results. The mean results are not presented since they are affected by the presence of outliers. The 
adjusted median change is given by the median change subtracted by the industry change that may affect 
the results of both groups equally. In the first column, the change of the three years after the acquisition in 
relation to the year before is presented. In the following columns, the change of the first, second and third 
years after the acquisition in relation to the year before is displayed. Source: own calculations. The 
classification *, **, ***, correspond to the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level for 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test. 
  From -1 to 3y From -1 to +1 From -1 to +2 From -1 to +3 
Panel A: ROA         
  Median change (p.p.) -1.80 ** -1.48 ** -2.13 ** -1.67  
  Adjusted Median change (p.p.) -2.21 * -1.01 ** -2.18 ** -1.63  
Panel B: EBIT Margin           Median change (p.p.) -3.95 ** -3.00 ** -5.32 *** -5.72 ** 
  Adjusted Median change (p.p.) -3.70 ** -2.67 ** -5.44 *** -4.87 ** 
Panel C: Asset Turnover           Median change (p.p.) -0.70  0.20  -1.90  -1.62  
  Adjusted Median change (p.p.) -1.02  -0.28  -1.82  -2.04  
 
6.2.2 Multivariate Analysis 
As stated before the long-term effects of acquiring a firm from the hotel and 
lodging industry in the operating performance of the acquiring firm was also studied 
through a OLS estimation of a difference-in-difference model.  
As explained before, the model includes a variable dummy, Dacquiring, that 
takes the value 1 for acquiring firms and 0 otherwise, another variable dummy, Dpost,  
that takes the value 1 in the post-acquisition years and 0 otherwise and an interactive 
dummy (Dacquiring*Dpost) that captures the effect of the acquisition. 
For each operating performance variable, the model was first estimated 
considering the three years after the acquisition, i.e., just comparing the period after the 
acquisition with the period before (columns (1) to (4)) and then considering each year 
after the acquisition individually (columns (5) to (8)). Therefore, in models (5) to (8), 
the variable Dpost and the interactive dummy Dacquiring*Dpost were replaced by 
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different dummy variables for each year after the acquisition: the variables Dpost1, 
Dpost2 and Dpost3 and the variables Dacquiring*Dpost1, Dacquiring*Dpost2 and 
Dacquiring*Dpost3, respectively. 
The model was also estimated with and without the controlling variable 
log(Total Assets) to verify the robustness of the conclusions.  
 
6.2.2.1 ROA 
Table 8 displays the results obtained by the regression of our difference-in-
difference model using as endogenous variable the return-on-assets ratio. The 
differences between the acquiring and non-acquiring firms are not statistically 
significant, thus the acquisition has no significant impact even though the coefficients 
associated to the variables Dacquiring*Dpost (that represents the effect of the 
acquisition) are negative but not statistically different from zero, which suggests that the 
profitability did not change after the acquisition. The same is true for the coefficients 
associated to the dummy variables for each year after the acquisition. 
The addition of the control variable log (total assets) in columns (4) and (8) has 
positive and statistically significant coefficients at a 1% level, indicating that the 
performance of a firm can be influenced by its size, i.e. bigger firms tend to present 
higher margins. 
These results are not consistent with the univariate analysis which indicates that 
the profitability is negative and statistically significant. As the multivariate analysis 
examines more than a single variable and it controls for other factors that may influence 
the results, it gives a more compound and realistic idea than analysing only a single 
variable. It also provides a powerful test of significance when compared to the 
univariate methods. Therefore, these results are more robust and suggest that acquisition 
do not affect the profitability of acquiring firms. 
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Table 8. The effect of acquisitions on ROA ratio. 
This table gives detail regarding the impact of acquisitions in the return-on-assets ratio for the three years after the acquisition. First, we analyse the three years in an 
aggregated manner, from columns (2) to (4) and second, we analyse the three years after the acquisition separately, from columns (5) to (8). This model has as dependent 
variable the ROA. The model also has a control variable in order to control the influence of the firm’s size. Standard errors are reported under the coefficient in parenthesis. 
Source: own calculations. The *, **, *** indicates if the results are statically significant for a level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dacquiring -0.012  -0.000  0.012  0.012    -0.007  0.012  0.012  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.015)    (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.015)  
Dpost   -0.012  0.000  -0.001            (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.015)          
Dpost1         -0.017  -0.017  -0.004  -0.005          (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.015)  
Dpost2         -0.008  -0.008  0.007  0.004          (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.016)  
Dpost3         -0.007  -0.007  0.004  0.002          (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.017)  (0.016)  
Dacquiring*Dpost     -0.025  -0.028              (0.022)  (0.021)          
Dacquiring*Dpost1             -0.025  -0.028              (0.022)  (0.022)  
Dacquiring*Dpost2             -0.031  -0.032              (0.023)  (0.022)  
Dacquiring*Dpost3             -0.023  -0.025              (0.024)  (0.023)  
Log(Total Assets)       0.020 ***       0.021 ***       (0.007)        (0.005)  
Constant 0.068 *** 0.068 *** 0.062 *** -0.044  0.068 *** 0.072 *** 0.062 *** -0.051 * (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.037)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.029)  
N 116  116  116  116  214  214  214  214  
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6.2.2.2 EBIT Margin 
Table 9 show the results of our DID model with the EBIT margin as proxy for 
operating performance, i.e., dependent variable. 
As shown previously in the descriptive statistic, our model confirms that the 
acquiring firms achieved before the acquisition higher EBIT margins than non-
acquiring firms. The coefficient associated to Dacquiring is always positive and 
statistically different from zero. However, the acquisitions have no effect on EBIT 
margin as, even though the coefficients associated to the variables Dacquiring*Dpost 
are almost always negative they are not statistically different from zero. 
Effectively, a decrease in the EBIT margin is noted after an acquisition as the 
coefficients associated to Dpost in models (5) and (6) are negative and statistically 
significant, yet the decrease does not occur exclusively in the acquiring firms. 
Finally, the coefficients associated with log (total assets) are positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that larger firms tend to have higher margins. 
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Table 9. The effect of acquisitions on EBIT margin ratio. 
This table gives detail regarding the impact of acquisitions in the EBIT margin ratio for the three years after the acquisition. First, we analyse the three years in an 
aggregated manner, from columns (2) to (4) and second, we analyse the three years after the acquisition separately, from columns (5) to (8). This model has as dependent 
variable the EBIT margin. The model also has a control variable in order to control the influence of the firm’s size. Standard errors are reported under the coefficient in 
parenthesis. Source: own calculations. The *, **, *** indicates if the results are statically significant for a level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dacquiring -0.049 * 0.051 * 0.084 ** 0.084 **   0.035 * 0.084 ** 0.084 ** (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.041)  (0.040)    (0.020)  (0.038)  (0.037)  
Dpost   -0.049 * -0.016  -0.019          
  (0.029)  (0.041)  (0.040)          
Dpost1         -0.054 ** -0.054 ** -0.019  -0.020  
        (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.038)  (0.037)  
Dpost2         -0.031  -0.031  0.008  0.002  
        (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.040)  (0.038)  
Dpost3         -0.050 * -0.050 * -0.024  -0.029  
        (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.040)  (0.039)  
Dacquiring*Dpost     -0.067  -0.073          
    (0.059)  (0.057)          
Dacquiring*Dpost1             -0.071  -0.078  
            (0.054)  (0.052)  
Dacquiring*Dpost2             -0.078  -0.082  
            (0.056)  (0.054)  
Dacquiring*Dpost3             -0.053  -0.057  
            (0.057)  (0.055)  
Log(Total Assets)       0.049 ***       0.047 *** 
      (0.018)        (0.012)  
Constant 0.166 *** 0.140 *** 0.124 *** -0.142  0.166 *** 0.148 *** 0.124 *** -0.131 * (0.021)  (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.100)  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.027)  (0.071)  
N 116  116  116  116  214  214  214  214  
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6.2.2.3 Asset Turnover 
Finally, the results of our model using the asset turnover (scale efficiency) as 
endogenous variable are presented in Table 10. 
Contrary to the EBIT margin, the results suggest that acquiring firms present 
before the acquisition a lower asset turnover ratio than the non-acquiring firms. The 
coefficients associated to the Dacquiring is always negative and statistically different 
form zero, except for model (1). 
The acquisition has no effect in the productivity of the acquiring forms as the 
coefficients associated to the interactive dummy Dacquiring*Dpost are not statistically 
significant. The same is true for the coefficients associated to the interactive dummy 
variables for each year after the acquisition. 
The addition of the control variable log (total assets) in columns (4) and (8) 
suggest that larger firms tend to present worst productivity.  
 
The difference-in-difference model, though hurt by the reduced number of 
observations it ends up confirming the previous conclusions – acquiring firms’ 
profitability decrease after the acquisition. However, the results of these models (as well 
as the entire study) should be read with some care and certain reservations due to the 
reduced size of the sample. 
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Table 10. The effect of acquisitions on asset turnover ratio. 
This table gives detail regarding the impact of acquisitions in the asset turnover ratio for the three years after the acquisition. First, we analyse the three years in an 
aggregated manner, from columns (2) to (4) and second, we analyse the three years after the acquisition separately, from columns (5) to (8). This model has as dependent 
variable the asset turnover. The model also has a control variable in order to control the influence of the firm’s size. Standard errors are reported under the coefficient in 
parenthesis. Source: own calculations. The *, **, *** indicates if the results are statically significant for a level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dacquiring -0.018  -0.445 *** -0.378 * -0.377 *   -0.464 *** -0.378 * -0.376 * (0.150)  (0.144)  (0.205)  (0.202)    (0.113)  (0.219)  (0.215)  
Dpost   -0.018  0.048  0.062          
  (0.144)  (0.205)  (0.202)          
Dpost1         -0.040  -0.040  0.026  0.030  
        (0.160)  (0.154)  (0.219)  (0.215)  
Dpost2         -0.011  -0.011  0.044  0.071  
        (0.166)  (0.160)  (0.228)  (0.223)  
Dpost3         0.033  0.033  0.089  0.117  
        (0.168)  (0.162)  (0.230)  (0.226)  
Dacquiring*Dpost     -0.134  -0.112          
    (0.289)  (0.285)          
Dacquiring*Dpost1             -0.131  -0.098  
            (0.310)  (0.304)  
Dacquiring*Dpost2             -0.110  -0.091  
            (0.322)  (0.316)  
Dacquiring*Dpost3             -0.113  -0.092  
            (0.326)  (0.319)  
Log(Total Assets)       -0.193 **       -0.219 *** 
      (0.089)        (0.071)  
Constant 0.672 *** 0.894 *** 0.861 *** 1.905 *** 0.672 *** 0.904 *** 0.861 *** 2.048 *** (0.106)  (0.125)  (0.145)  (0.503)  (0.113)  (0.123)  (0.155)  (0.413)  
N 116  116  116  116  214  214  214  214  
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7. CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The main objective of this dissertation was to test whether acquisitions between 
hotels create value to the acquiring hotels’ shareholders. 
In the past three decades, M&A activity of hotels and lodging firms increased 
tremendously becoming an interesting and opportune topic to be studied. However, the 
results of previous (scarce) literature are not consistent regarding the acquirers short and 
long-term post-acquisition returns. 
This study intends to overcome such problems by using both market data and 
accounting data to examine the M&A effects on the short and long-term of acquiring 
hotel and lodging firms whose acquisitions occurred between 1999 and 2015. 
An event study analysis based on the CAARs around the announcement day for 
the short-term analysis and a univariate and a multivariate analysis for the long-term 
effects were performed. 
The results regarding the short-term effects of acquirers in the hotel and lodging 
industry showed that in general there is a neutral effect in the firms’ value around the 
announcement day, except for day -10 until day -5 where are presented wealth gains for 
the “future” acquiring firms’ shareholders. However, this “gain” is short living as tend 
to disappear once the acquisition is announced. This evidence of insignificant effects in 
our study is consistent with Kim et al. (2008) and Hsu and Jan (2006). 
According to our univariate analysis, the acquisitions of hotel and lodging firms 
have a positive effect on both sales and total assets variables. Regarding the profitability 
of the firms, the acquisition has a negative impact, as the profitability measures tend to 
(significantly) decrease after the acquisition. Even though this decrease can be either 
due to the acquisition itself or simply a consequence of the good (punctual) 
performance verified in the year before the acquisition. Nonetheless, in any case the 
acquisition did not add any value to the acquiring shareholder. These results are not 
consistent with the findings of Kim (2006). 
Then, a difference-in-difference model was estimated. The results of the model, 
using the ROA and asset turnover ratios as dependent variables (as proxy for operating 
performance) suggest that the acquisition is neutral in terms of operating performance. 
Although, if the EBIT margin is used as dependent variable, the results suggest a 
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decrease (statistically significant) of the operating performance of acquiring firms, the 
decrease also happened to non-acquiring firms.  
In sum, the results of this dissertation allow us to conclude that the short 
(financial) and long-term (operating) performance of acquiring hotel and lodging firms 
does not change significantly after the acquisition as most of the evidence suggest a 
neutral impact.  
This dissertation however has some limitations that should be taken in 
consideration when interpreting the findings. The small sample size (due to lack of data 
available) and the lack of information regarding some factors like the type of payments 
and type of merger that were not controlled in this study, are some examples. 
Additionally, other events, that may affect the stock prices of the firms, such as an 
acquisition announcement of a major competitor, were not also considered. Despite 
these limitations, it is believed that this study has a significant impact on both the 
financial and operational performance analysis of acquiring firms in the hotel and 
lodging industry. 
Finally, this dissertation can be extended for future research, specifically 
increasing the sample size to obtain more robust results. Other types of performance 
measures such as market share and operational efficiencies, for instance average daily 
rate (ADR), occupancy rate and revenue per available room (RevPAR), would be 
worthy indicators. However, it is difficult to collect that information. There is also the 
possibility to analyse the impact of acquisitions in hospitality-related areas (travel and 
leisure industry) such as gaming industry, airlines, theme parks, restaurants and other 
leisure services. 
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ANNEXES 
Annex 1. Trend in hospitality firms’ mergers and acquisitions. 
This figure presents the total number and the total value of acquisitions made by (public and 
private) hotel and lodging companies between 1998 and 2015. During this period, there was a total of 
7,436 deals involving acquirers or targets from the hotel and lodging sector. The values are expressed in 
billions of Euros. Source: own calculations considering information of Zephyr database. 
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Annex 2. Main measures of financial performance. 
This table presents the main measures of financial performance used in the literature review of 
similar studies regarding mergers and acquisitions. Source: Gross, K. (2007). Equity ownership and 
performance: An empirical study of german traded companies: Springer Science & Business Media. 
Measure Definition Representative Studies 
Market-based measures 
Cumulated abnormal returns 
(CAR) 
Cumulated abnormal stock 
returns from a single 
unexpected event. 
Eckbo and Smith, 1998]; 
Lewellen et al., 1985; Loderer 
and Martin, 1997; Seyhun, 
1986; Slovin and Sushka, 
1993. 
Market returns (MR) 
Growth in stock value over a 
specific period assuming that 
dividends are reinvested. 
Chaganti and Damanpour, 
1991; Holl, 1977; Kim et al., 
1988; Stano, 1976. 
Accounting-based measures 
Return on equity (ROE) 
Net earnings after interest 
expenses and taxes divided by 
shareholders’ equity. 
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; 
Kamerschen, 1968; Monsen et 
al., 1968; Palmer, 1973b; Short 
and Keasey, 1999. 
Return on assets (ROA) 
Earnings before interest 
expenses and taxes (EBIT) 
divided bytotal assets. 
Denis and Denis, 1994; 
Himmelberg et al., 1999; Kole, 
1996; Mehran, 1995; Oswald 
and Jahera Jr., 1991. 
Return on investment (ROI) 
Earnings divided by value of 
equity plus long-term debt. 
Gugler et al., 2003a, 2004; 
Schellenger et al., 1989. 
Earnings per share (EPS) 
Earnings divided by number of 
outstanding shares. 
Kesner, 1987; Kim et al., 1988. 
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Annex 3. Main results of prior studies in mergers and acquisitions post-acquisition 
performance. 
This table summarises prior studies on announcement abnormal returns of mergers and 
acquisitions for firms involved in mergers and acquisitions; while most studies provide abnormal returns 
for acquirers, a number of previous studies also report combined abnormal returns for target firms. 
Results Target/Acquirer Author(s) 
Positive abnormal returns Target 
Asquith, 1983; Malatesta, 1983; Frank and 
Harris, 1989; Firth, 1980; Limmack, 1991; 
Franks et al, 1991. 
Negative abnormal returns 
Acquirer 
Langetieg, 1978; Asquith, 1983; Agrawal 
et al, 1992; Jensen and Ruback, 1983); 
Firth, 1980; Limmack, 1991; Buhner, 
1991; Kennedy and Limmack, 1996; 
Gregory, 1997; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; 
Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Sudarsanam 
and Mahate, 2003; Aw and Chatterjee, 
2004; Croci, 2007; Bouwman et al., 2009; 
Malatesta, 1983; Yaghoubi et al., 2014. 
No abnormal returns 
Franks et al, 1991; Loderer and Martin, 
1992; Franks et al., 1977; Dodd and 
Ruback, 1977; Frank and Harris, 1988; 
Higson and Elliott, 1998; Chatterjee, 2000; 
Datta et al., 2001; Andrade et al, 2001; 
Conn et al., 2004; Gregory and 
McCorriston, 2005. 
Positive abnormal returns 
Mandelker, 1974; Moeller et al., 2004; 
Healy et al., 1992. 
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Annex 4. Main methodological aspects of similar short-term studies. 
This table summarises prior studies on short-term results of similar studies of mergers and acquisitions in the hotel and lodging industry. Prior studies typically 
document positive short-term returns for both acquirers and targets. MM = market model; CAR = cumulative abnormal returns; MR = mean return; JMM = Jensen measure 
model. 
  
                                               
11 The sample consisted of 15 acquiring firms for market measure performance analysis and 23 firms for accounting measure performance analysis. 
12 For the market-based measures Kim (2006) studied 91 hotel firms (38 acquirers and 53 targets) plus 159 restaurants firms (79 acquirers and 80 targets) and for the 
accounting-based measures a total of 14 firms were analysed (5 hotel firms and 9 restaurant firms). 
13 Their sample consisted on a total of 452 transactions by publicly traded acquirers of 34 listed and 418 unlisted targets. 
14 The number of hotel firms included in the study was 119. 
Author(s) 
Sample 
period 
No. of 
Obs. 
Estimation 
period 
(days) 
Event 
window 
(days) 
Methodology 
Results 
Acquirers Targets 
Kwansa (1994) 1980-1990 8 -200, -51 -30, +30 MM CAR - Positive 
Canina (2001) 1982-2000 7 -111, -12 -1, +1 MR AR Positive Positive 
Hsu and Jan (2006) 1985-2000 5/2311 -250, -51 -5, +5 JMM/ MM CAR Negative - 
Kim (2006) 1980-2004 112 -200, -51 -10, +10 MM CAR Negative Positive 
Kim et al (2008) 1980-2004 91/5 -200, -51 -10, +10 MM CAR Positive Positive 
Ma et al. (2011) 1981-2006 5213 - -2, +2 MM CAR Positive - 
Chatfield et al. (2012) 1985-2004 8214 -240, -61 -1, 0 MM CAR Positive - 
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Annex 5. Main methodological aspects of similar long-term studies. 
This table summarises prior studies on long-term results of similar studies of mergers and acquisitions in the hotel and lodging industry. Prior studies typically 
document negative long-term returns for acquirers and positive long-term returns for targets. MM = market model; CAR = cumulative abnormal returns; JMM = Jensen 
measure model; ROA = return-on-assets ratio; ROE = return-on-equity ratio; Op.CFA = operating cash flow to assets ratio; SA = sales to asset ratio; ΔS = change in sales. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
15 The estimation period analysed in this study was from the -36 until the -7 month. 
16 The sample consisted of 15 acquiring firms for market measure performance analysis and 23 firms for accounting measure performance analysis. 
17 For the market-based measures Kim (2006) studied 91 hotel firms (38 acquirers and 53 targets) plus 159 restaurants firms (79 acquirers and 80 targets) and for the 
accounting-based measures a total of 14 firms were analysed (5 hotel firms and 9 restaurant firms). 
Author(s) 
Sample 
period 
No. of 
Obs. 
Event 
window 
(months) 
Methodology 
Results 
Acquirers Targets 
Sheel and Nagpal (2000) 1980-1990 21 -6, +3615 JMM/ MM CAR Negative - 
Hsu and Jan (2006) 1985-2000 15/2316 -36, +36 ROA/ROE Negative - 
Kim (2006) 1980-2004 9117 -60, +60 ROA/ROE/Op.CFA/SA/ΔS Negative Positive 
Yang et al. (2009) 1996-2007 19 0, +12 JMM CAR Positive - 
